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Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas
MacArthur in the Philippines:
There Must Be a Day of Reckoning
Kerry Irish

Abstract
In 1935 Major Dwight Eisenhower accompanied General Douglas MacArthur to the Philippines, where MacArthur was tasked with creating a Philippine army capable of defending an independent Philippines. Eisenhower's
odyssey in the American colony (1935-39) left him with a deep and indelible
negative impression of MacArthur. Historians have disputed the cause and
depth of the rift. Ike's disagreements with MacArthur were more philosophical than personal and concerned two significant issues: building an army in
a developing but still impoverished country, and the leadership qualities that
an American army officer should exhibit and develop in his subordinates.
The dispute and resulting antipathy lasted the rest of their lives.

I

n 1935, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower was serving in the War Department
as an aide to U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur. By fall
of that year MacArthur had been appointed to the new position of Military
Adviser to the Philippines. His task was to create a Philippine army capable
of defending the island nation once independence, planned for 1946, had been
achieved. MacArthur, impressed with Eisenhower, virtually insisted that the
major accompany him to the Islands. Eisenhower went, albeit reluctantly, and
would spend the next four years in a difficult and ultimately frustrating job.
Dr. Kerry Irish is professor of American history at George Fox University in Newberg, Oregon. He is the author of Clarence C. Dill, 1he Life ofa l#stern Politician. His article ''Apt Pupil: Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan" appeared in 1he journal
ofMilitary History in January 2006. More recently, he authored a chapter on Eisenhower and
his cross-cultural leadership during World War Two in 1heArtofCommand: Military Leadership from George Washington to Colin Powell. He is working on a biography of Eisenhower up
to 7 December 1941.
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Eisenhower's sojourn in the Philippines with MacArthur left him with a deep
and indelible negative impression of the general. 1 Ike's disagreements with
MacArthur were more philosophical than personal. The dispute was engendered
over two significant issues.The first was how to build an army in a developing but
still impoverished nation; exacerbating that disagreement was a deep difference
over the leadership qualities that an American army officer should exhibit, and
endeavor to develop, in his subordinates.
Historians have differed over the years as to whether the conflicts between
Eisenhower and MacArthur in the Philippines resulted in lasting ill feelings and
estrangement, or were the normal irritations of two strong-minded men and were
largely forgotten as the years passed. A large group of highly regarded historians
have taken the latter view. Ike's son, JohnS. D. Eisenhower, takes perhaps the most
charitable view of the disputes between his father and MacArthur. He wrote, "I
do not believe that everything he [Ike] said in those pages [Ike's diary] represents
his lifetime views of Douglas MacArthur." John Eisenhower largely followed D.
Clayton James, who in 7he Years of MacArthur, volume 1, 1880-1941, notes the
heated words over the Philippine parade incident of 1938, but asserts that the
disagreements between the two men have been, as Eisenhower himself claimed,
"exaggerated." James goes on to emphasize the mutual respect they had for one
another. John Gunther argues that there was "no real split at that time [Ike's
Philippine tour]." Stephen Ambrose has written a comprehensive account of the
MacArthur-Eisenhower relationship, but Ambrose's assessment is perhaps the
most disappointing. In a passage that clearly summarizes the entire relationship,
Ambrose argues that the descriptions of conflict and animosity are overdone and
simplistic; the two men had a "rich and complex" relationship. He takes at face value
Eisenhower's later assertion of a "strong tie" to MacArthur. But in the following
chapter on the Philippines, Ambrose forgets these comments and allows that the
friendship had ended when Eisenhower left the Philippines. Geoffrey Perret in
Eisenhower notes some of the disputes but charitably describes both men as victims
of circumstance and the macro forces of history. Perret also wrote a biography
of MacArthur before his Eisenhower work. In that volume Perret describes the
relationship as strained but still respectful; Eisenhower especially was careful to stay
on good terms with MacArthur. When Ike lambasts the general in his diary, it is
because of strain and exhaustion. Richard Connaughton explains the differences
between the two men by emphasizing the diverse nature of their military education,
and their vastly different personalities. He accurately notes, however, that their clash
was in the context of the difficult problem of creating the Philippine defense force.
Nevertheless, their animosity may not have been permanent. 2
1. Dwight D. Eisenhower, interview by D . Clayton James, 29 August 1967, p. 2, Eisenhower Library (EL), Abilene, Kansas.
2. John S.D. Eisenhower, General Ike: A Personal Reminiscence (New York: Free Press, 2003),
28; D. Clayton James, 7he Years if MacArthur, vol. 1, 1880-1941 (Boston: Houghton Miffiin
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Another significant group of historians have argued that the relationship was
permanently damaged during the Philippine years, but there is little agreement
as to the cause of the animosity. Carlo D'Este describes some of the arguments
between Ike and MacArthur, but ascribes their lasting estrangment to their mutual
frustrations in building the Filipino army and their diverse personalities. Matthew
Holland recognizes that the relationship between Eisenhower and MacArthur had
been broken; he places the blame on MacArthur but does not go into great detail.
Peter Lyon's Eisenhower: Portrait of the Hero accepts Ike's assertion that after the
parade incident "our relationships were never really close." Steve Neal agrees with
Lyon. William Pickett correctly notes that Ike's experiences with MacArthur resulted
in their "essential estrangement." In Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years, Carol
Petillo writes that in the Philippines, "seeds of their future rivalry and distrust had
been sown, and a certain coolness in their relationship could be noted."Mark Perry
assesses the Eisenhower-MacArthur relationship in Partners in Command, a dual
biography of Eisenhower and George C. Marshall. Perry argues that Eisenhower's
Philippine years were agonizing and the antagonism between Ike and the general
grew steadily worse. Perry claims that MacArthur was particularly "keen to build up
the Philippine military," a comment that would have caused Eisenhower's temper
to flare. He observes that in later years Eisenhower was polite to MacArthur, but he
had little use for his old commander. In Ike the Soldier Merle Miller takes the view
that there was certainly a "rift" between the two men that never healed, and that
MacArthur was largely responsible because he believed the rumors that Eisenhower
was angling for his job through certain influential Filipinos and never forgave Ike.
Miller also asserts that Ike had had enough ofMacArthur. Piers Brendon's generally
acerbic tone served him well in assessing the MacArthur-Eisenhower dispute. He
argues that the animosity between the two men was deep and lasting. In The Far
Eastern General Michael Schaller describes MacArthur's jealousy of Eisenhower's
relationship with Philippine President Manuel Qyezon. The general's subsequent
belief that his subordinate was angling for his job was "fatal" to their relationship.
Michael Korda also notes that the enmity between the two men was serious and
lasting but sheds little light on the reasons. Indeed, he inaccurately writes that
MacArthur "never hesitated to let Ike get on with things, and never second-guessed
him."In an early biography ofMacArthur, Clark Lee and Richard Henschel strongly
argue that the ill feelings between Ike and MacArthur were permanent and stemmed
from the Philippine years. In American Caesar William Manchester suggests the
parade incident cooled the MacArthur-Eisenhower relationship and the passing
Company, 1970), 526, 564, 565; John Gunther, Eisenhower: 1he Man and the Symbol (New York:
Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1951), 65; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General of
the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 93, 94, 117, 118;
Geoffrey Perret, Eisenhower (New York: Random House, 1999), 126-30; Geoffrey Perret, Old
Soldiers Never Die: 1he Life of Douglas MacArthur (New York: Random House, 1996), 212-16,
268,501, 502; Richard Connaughton, MacArthur and Difeat in the Philippines (New York: Overlook Press, 2001), 75-85,230, 231.
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years only hardened their opinions. For Manchester the two men were incapable of
understanding one another. MacArthur dismissed Eisenhower's accomplishments
in World War II because Ike had not commanded troops in the field; Eisenhower
criticized MacArthur's interference in political matters and supported President
Harry S. Truman when he fired MacArthur in 1951. MacArthur once wrote of
Eisenhower that he was like a younger brother; Manchester observed it was "more
like the feeling Cain had for Abel." Manchester notes MacArthur could not abide a
subordinate who had risen to the heights Eisenhower had in the postwar world. 3
The foregoing is a brief summary of the scholarship on this issue. In order to
understand the Eisenhower-MacArthur animosity, it is necessary to take a brief
look at the careers of the two men before the Philippine years, to understand the
relationship between the United States and the Philippines in the 1930s, and to
grasp the essentials of the American effort to help build a Philippine defense force.
MacArthur, still a relatively young man, became army chief of staff in 1930.
In November 1929, as the stock market crashed, Eisenhower went to work for
Major General George Van Horn Moseley in Washington. His job was to create
the first full industrialization and mobilization plan the nation had ever possessed.
His superb work garnered the attention of the chief of staff, who soon stole Ike
from Moseley. 4 Eisenhower worked for MacArthur in Washington in some of
the darkest days of the Great Depression. The army budget was attacked as was
the army itself in these deeply isolationist years. MacArthur fought to save what
he could of the army. Ike thought that MacArthur may have erred in trying to
save military personnel as opposed to equipment. But then he conceded that the
general was probably right given that cutting deeply into personnel would have
had a negative impact on morale. 5 Nevertheless, Ike's analysis of the situation and
3. Carlo D'Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier's Lift (New York: Henry Holt, 2002), 239, 240, 254,
255; Matthew Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 188;
Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait ofthe Hero (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1974), 81-82; Steve
Neal, 1be Eisenhowers: Reluctant Dynasty (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc.,
1978), 102-3; William B. Pickett, Dwight David Eisenhower and American Power (Wheeling,
Ill.: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1995), 27; Carol Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: 1be Philippine Years
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 191; Mark Perry, Partners in Command: George
Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2007), 7, 49, 50,
373-74; Merle Miller, Ike the Soldier: As 1bey Knew Him (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1987),
290; Piers Brendon, Ike His Lift and Times (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1986), 69,
70, 77; Michael Schaller, 1be Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 40,
57-66; Michael Korda, Ike: An American Hero (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007), 207,
220, 607; Clark Lee and Richard Henschel, Douglas MacArthur (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1952), 98, 99; William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 173,689,273,478,438,648,530.
4. Holland, Eisenhower Between the Wars, 108, 110.
5. Chief of Staff Diary, 3 April1933, in Eisenhower: 1be Prewar Diaries and Selected Papers,
1905-1941, ed. Daniel Holt and James Leyerzapf (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1998), 250.
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his preference for equipment over men was a foreshadowing of the view he would
take in the Philippines when the defense budget came under attack there. Strongminded men both, MacArthur and Eisenhower had other disagreements in these
Washington years, none more pointed than MacArthur's decision to personally lead
American soldiers against the so-called Bonus Marchers in 1932. Ike did not think
the chief of staff should be leading troops through the streets ofWashington.6 Nor
did Ike appreciate the army's seniority system for promotion. He preferred a meritbased system. MacArthur still liked the old way, arguing it kept favoritism out of
the equation. Eisenhower acknowledged that, but thought it kept talent out of the
equation as well? These disagreements certainly raised Eisenhower's consciousness
regarding the man for whom he worked. But they cannot be said to mark the
estrangement that is so evident in the later Philippine years. Ike was too much the
realist, too level-headed, to let the promotion issue become personal. On the same
page of his diary that reflects his disagreement with MacArthur over promotions,
he strongly asserts his respect for the general's abilities, and his personal affection for
MacArthur. Indeed, he remarks that MacArthur preferred the seniority system not
out of malice to anyone, but rather, after long consideration of the subject, as "the
lesser of two evils. "8
In June 1933,Ike was offered a position with the Public Works Administration.
He told MacArthur about the offer but was relieved when MacArthur"emphatically
refused." Eisenhower, clearly pleased that the general would not part with him,
wrote "so that's that!" "I am glad I am staying with the General. "9 When their
service together in Washington ended in 1935, Eisenhower knew the general, like
all men, was flawed, but he still respected him. That was not the case when Ike left
the Philippines in 1939. 10
In 1935 MacArthur, whose term as chief of staff was soon to end, was
designated the Military Adviser to the Philippine Government, the head of the
American Military Mission in the Philippine Islands. His task was to create a
Philippine defense force that could defend the islands once independence had
been gained from the United States in 1946. Since the end of the Spanish
American War in 1898, the Philippines had been an American colony, and an
American governor-general had headed the civilian government. When the
Tydings-McDuffie Act was passed in 1934, the Americans created the Philippine
Commonwealth and declared their intent to free the Filipinos in twelve years.
MacArthur and Eisenhower, along with a small staff, arrived in the Islands in
6. Dwight Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends (Garden City, N .Y.: Doubleday &
Company, 1967), 216.
7. Chief of Staff Diary, 15 June 1932, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 'Ihe Prewar Diaries, 226, 230.
8.lbid.
9. Chief of Staff Diary, 2 June 1933, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 'Ihe Prewar Diaries,
252.
10. Ibid. In the Chief of Staff Diary, 8 June 1934, note the respect with which Eisenhower
describes MacArthur's fight for the army budget.
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Douglas MacArthur and staffarriving in the Philippines, October 1935; Dwight
Eisenhower is the third from the left in the row of men behind MacArthur.

[Courtesy of the Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas]

October 1935. Even then, American military leaders were glancing nervously
toward the Land of the Rising Sun. 11
Faced with the monumental task of building a Philippine defense system
from virtually nothing in 1935, MacArthur allowed Ike to choose another officer
to help him create the Philippine defense plan. Eisenhower chose perhaps the
best man for the job, the man who would contribute most to the team. Major
James B. Ord was a West Point classmate of Eisenhower's. Raised in Mexico,
Ord spoke fluent Spanish, the Philippines' language of business and politics. The
bespectacled and corpulent Ord was an energetic, sophisticated, and well-read
man. He was attached to the Army War College where he chaired the Philippines
Defense Planning Committee. Ord's committee had already started work on the
Philippine defense plan. 12 He and Eisenhower continued working on it even as
they prepared to leave Washington in the fall of 1935. 13
11. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 43-47.
12. Ibid., 63, 64.
13. Diary of the American Military Mission in the Philippines Islands, 27 December 1935,
in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 293, 294.
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Unfortunately, Ord and Eisenhower were ill-informed of the limitations of
both money and talent in the Philippines which would dictate later revisions.
Those revisions meant substantial reductions in the officer corps, in professional
enlisted men, and in armaments and munitions. Eisenhower was typically reserved,
if nonetheless prescient, in his judgments of the plan at this point. Both he and
Ord told MacArthur that reducing the Philippine defense budget from 22 million
pesos to 16 million wpuld make the creation of a credible defense difficult "because
of the lack of professional personnel." 14
MacArthur's Mission was not the only element of the American army in the
Philippines. Since the Spanish American War the U.S. Army had maintained a
sizable contingent in the islands known as the Philippine Department. Headed
by Major General Frank Parker, the department had been instructed to cooperate
with the Mission. 15 Unfortunately that cooperation was often withheld. Most
American officers believed the effort to create a viable Philippine army was
"ridiculous," while some feared that such an army might turn on its creator. 16
Among those who derided the effort, racism was common. Americans were not
unaware of the average Filipino's fighting qualities; indeed, many Americans
admired the Filipino soldiers who served in the Scouts, the Philippine segment
of the American armyP But most Americans doubted that Filipinos could
adequately command an army. MacArthur and Eisenhower held more progressive
views. 18 Making matters worse, the High Commissioner of the Philippines, Frank
Murphy, was opposed to the entire purpose of the MacArthur Mission, and often
thwarted the development of Philippine defense capability. Murphy was a pacifist
who believed the Philippines were indefensible. 19
Eisenhower bemoaned the lack of cooperation between the Mission and
the Philippine Department. He could not understand why the War Department,
whose officers held many of the same beliefs as the Philippine Department, did
not see the wisdom of cooperating with the Mission in creating a Philippine army.
In his diary he chided the War Department:
The Tydings McDuffie Act [the law that mandated independence
in 1946] so clearly contemplates the employment of the Philippine
Army by the President of the United States, in the event of a
14. Ibid., 295.
15. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, i.n Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 308;
Ricardo T. Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942 (Manila: Manila University Press, 1992), 40.
16. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
307; Brian Linn, Guardians of Empire: 1he US Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 240.
17. Edward Coffman, 1he Regulars: 1he American Army, 1898-1941 (Cambridge, Mass.:
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 339; Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die, 197.
18. Diary entry, November 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,.
287; Diary entry, December 1935, in ibid., 292; Diary entry, 8 October 1937, in ibid., 363.
19.J. Woodford Howard, Mr. justice Murphy: A Political Biography (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 104-9.
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national emergency, that we believe the War Department could
make a definite effort to develop the strength and efficiency of this
military adjunct. For the next ten years complete responsibility
for Philippine Defense resides in the American government,
and since weakness in the local defenses would involve extreme
embarrassment in the event of war, it seems to us to be the part
of wisdom for the American government to take positive and
appropriate action in the matter. 20
Lack of support from the American army would form but one of the problems that
brought Eisenhower and MacArthur into conflict.
The purpose of the revised defense plan remained "to assure the maximum
local protection of the various islands."21 Because the Philippines could afford
only a token air force and no modern navy, each island would have to supply the
recruits who would defend it. The army would engage in a "cordon defense" of each
island; that is, the Philippine army would attempt to defeat an attacking force at
the beaches behind an established line of defense. Eisenhower did not believe
that such a defense, essentially a desperation defense, could stop a determined
modern army supported by air and naval forces. 22 Although MacArthur also
made pronouncements about American responsibility to defend the Philippines, 23
he became increasingly confident that given time, he could create a significant
Filipino force that would cause any enemy to undertake a cost benefit analysis
that would conclude that the Philippines were not worth the trouble. 24 In the
meantime, the United States would, MacArthur was sure, increasingly help with
Philippine defense. As we shall see, it was this belief, in the face of considerable
evidence to the contrary, combined with MacArthur's unwarranted optimism
regarding the creation of the Philippine army, and his lackadaisical and misguided
efforts to improve it, which would form the nexus of the conflict between himself
20. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
307.
21. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
294.
22.1bid.
23. D'Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, 236, 237.
24. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 294; Address to the faculty and student body of the Command and General Staff School
at Baguio, Philippine Islands, 3 August 1936, in A Soldier Speaks: Public Papers and Speeches of
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, by Douglas MacArthur, ed. Vorin E. Whan, Jr. (New
York: Praeger, 1965), 101-10; H. W. Brands, Bound to Empire: 1he United States and the Philippines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 168; Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: 1he Philippine
Years, 56; Eisenhower, At Ease, 230; Charles H. Bogart, "The Doomed Philippines Inland Seas
Defense Project," journal of the Council on America's Military Affiirs 14, no. 1 (1986): 39; John
Whitman, "MacArthur's Generalship: A Bad Decision Unredeemed, MacArthur's Decision to
Defend Luzon's Beaches," Valley Forge]ourna/6, no. 1 (1992): 2, 3. Whitman contends that MacArthur continued to overestimate the ability of his Philippine army in the early days ofWorld
War II, a miscalculation which led to the poor defense of the Philippines.
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and Dwight Eisenhower. MacArthur refused to countenance the possibility that
his assumptions could be in error. 25 1hen, as time passed, he seemed to place less
emphasis on the American element of his plan and more on the Philippine.
The Philippine defense plan featured nearly 1,000 professional officers and
7,000 enlisted men around whom would be raised substantial reserve units to be
called to active duty as needed. The professional soldiers would be largely engaged
in training the reservists. Beginning in 1941,20,000 reservists were to be trained
every six months, 40,000 per year. 26 1hese reservists were to be drawn from the
male population at the age of twenty and would be available for service for thirty
years. They would serve for ten years in the "Hrst Reserve" and then pass into
the "Second Reserve."27 1hus the Philippines would have a 400,000-man reserve
army ten years from the time the plan was fully implemented. 28 Graduates of the
new Philippine "West Point" at Baguio would gradually augment the professional
officer corps. Eisenhower took particular interest in this school as he knew the
army would be only as good as its officers. The Philippine defense planners initially
envisioned an air force of fifty bombers and thirty other aircraft. They hoped
these planes would inflict inordinate damage on any fleet brave enough to invade
Philippine waters and would also facilitate transportation between the various
army outposts. The Philippine army was to be cheaply supplied with obsolete
American weapons and equipment. 29
Most of 1936 was to be used in building the necessary infrastructure and
training facilities for the army. Starting from virtually nothing, the original plan
called for training only 6,000 recruits in 1937.30 The buildings, equipment, trained
instructors, and money to train more men were simply not available. 31
The new Filipino army was to incorporate the existing Philippine Constabulary,
the 6,000-man national police force. This consolidation would save money and
enhance the police force while giving the army a base from which to build. 32
Eisenhower found that there were men of ability in the Constabulary, but they
had little experience "in the administration oflarge organizations."33 1he Filipino
25. Connaughton, MacArthur and Deftat, 67.
26. Memorandum For General MacArthur, 15 June 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 312; Connaughton, MacArthur and Deftat, 52.
27.Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942,35.
28. Connaughton, MacArthur and Deftat, 60.
29. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
294; Diary of the American Military Mission in the Philippine Islands, 20 January 1936, in ibid.,
304; Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in ibid., 301; Diary entry, 6 February 1936, in ibid., 305; Diary
entry, 15 February 1936, in ibid., 307.
30. Diary entry, 29 May 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
309.
31. Diary entry, 29 May 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 309;
Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in ibid., 300.
32. Connaughton, MacArthur and Deftat, 52; Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942, 51.
33. Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
301.
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army was to have one regular division and eventually thirty reserve divisions. The
Mission also organized a command structure for the Filipino army to be fleshed
out with Filipino officers. 34 These men would not be under MacArthur, who
commanded no one but his own staff. He was the military adviser to President
~ezon, nothing else.
Once the recruits had been inducted, their training was to take place near
their homes, in keeping with the manner in which these soldiers would serve in an
emergency. There was no transportation to move large bodies of men from place
to place in either peace or war. The reserve units had to be trained and deployed on
their home islands. 35 This necessitated a large number of induction and training
centers. The defense plan initially called for the creation of ten divisional districts,
each with thirteen "training cadres" that would handle the training of 155 men
each year or about 78 per class, two five-and-one-half-month classes per year.
Mobilization centers were also needed, about fifteen per division. 36
In late December 1935, a gloomy Eisenhower lamented the Mission's lack
of progress. Eisenhower, generally optimistic, initially had high expectations for
the Philippine army. Reality was sobering. Ike encountered significant problems
in virtually all areas, including his commander. Difficulties loomed as the year
came to an end: The Philippine Gerneral Staff, whose job it was to flesh out the
basic defense plan, oversee recruiting, and codify army regulations, had yet to
take shape. 37 If these problems were not addressed soon, Eisenhower anticipated
delaying the scheduled April 1936 registration of manpower. Ike noted in his
diary that both he and Ord had:
learned to expect from the Filipinos with whom we deal, a minimum
of performance from a maximum of promise. Among individuals
there is no lack of intelligence, but to us they seem, with few
exceptions, unaccustomed to the requirements of administrative
and executive procedure. When any detail is under discussion, they
seem to grasp the essentials of the problem, and readily agree to
undertake accomplishment ofwhatever decision may be arrived at in
conference. But thereafter it is quite likely that nothing whatsoever
will be done. Moreover it often develops that the decision itself
has not really been accepted by them, even though at the time they
appeared to be in full agreement. The whole matter must then be
gone over again. These peculiar traits we are learning to take into
account, but obviously they impede. progress. 38

34.Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942,36,37,38.
35. Ibid., 35, 36, 37.
36. Memorandum for General MacArthur, 15 June 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 313; Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942, 35, 36.
37. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
296,297.
38. Diary entry, 27 December 1935, in ibid., 297.
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If progress were to be made, a general staff had to be chosen. In January 1936 O!tezon finally made Jose de los Reyes, a former lieutenant colonel in the Constabulary,
the chief of staff. Eisenhower quickly gave the new General Staff responsibility for
creating the regulations of the army. Some progress was made, but Eisenhower was
still uncertain that the induction machinery would be ready by April. Eisenhower
and Ord were not happy with de los Reyes; by May 1936, MacArthur had secured
the appointment of Major General Paulino Santos as his successor. 39
One of the most difficult problems Eisenhower faced was to find men who
could train the recruits. About 240 enlisted men from the Philippine Scouts received
special training at Fort McKinley, the headquarters of the Philippine Department
near Manila, and were then assigned as instructors for the Philippine army, but more
were needed. 40 Graduates of the academy at Baguio would not have an impact for
four years. Meanwhile, a Reserve Officers Service School (ROSS), the graduates of
which would help train the inductees, was also inaugurated at Baguio.41
Another reason for the Mission's lack ofprogress was that the United States simply
did not know what to do with the Philippines.1his problem arose almost immediately
after Commodore George Dewey's destruction of the Spanish fleet in 1898, remained
unresolved through the 1920s, and was exacerbated by the Great Depression which
increased the financial straits under which the United States and thus the U.S. .Afmy
operated. The Tydings-McDuffie Act of 1934 was a step toward resolution but it was
by no means the final move. The United States was ostensibly committed to defending
the islands for at least ten years, but both its army and navy were unsure how to defend
the Philippines; indeed, many in both services were doubtful if they could, or should,
defend the archipelago at all. Worse, those who assumed the islands must be defended
tended to disagree as to how that defense might best be accomplished. Obviously,
those who thought that the Philippines would be expendable should a major Pacific
war occur were not about to support MacArthur's Mission; they deemed it foolish
to put money and materiel into an indefensible outpost. Then too, there were those
who would defend the islands but were opposed to arming the Filipinos for fear that
they might turn against their American masters. Finally, some American politicians
supported the basic idea of MacArthur's Mission but simply could not find the
rationale to place it higher on the priority list. Philippine Department officers shared
many ofthese views. No wonder Eisenhower and Ord felt as ifthey were the Robinson
Crusoe and his man Friday of the U.S. Army-cast away on a Pacific island and largely
forgotten--even by their commander.42 For the team-oriented Eisenhower this was
maddeningly frustrating; MacArthur was more inclined to rely on MacArthur.
39. Diary entry, 17 January 1936, in ibid., 301,·305, 310.
.
40.Jose, The Philippine Army, 1935- 1942,58,59.
41. Ibid., 59, 60; Louis Morton, The Fall ofthe Philippines (Washington: Office of the Chief
of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), 12, 13.
42. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 48-52, 90-92; Linn, Guardians ofEmpire, 219-21,
226-46; Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years, 184-86; Brands, Bound to Empire, 166.
Some scholars believe, following contemporary criticism of MacArthur's Mission, that Qyezon's
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The first substantive crack in the Eisenhower-MacArthur relationship appeared
when the two men disagreed over what should be done about the lack of progress
in the Mission's work, especially as that failure was due to poor cooperation from
the War Department in particular and the United States in general. Eisenhower
early recognized that the promised support for the Mission's work was simply not
forthcoming. He believed that there was both ignorance and miscommunication
involved in the impasse. Education was the answer and the teacher must be
perhaps the grandest American military figure of the era: Douglas MacArthur.
For Eisenhower time was crucial: MacArthur must return to Washington in
1936 and explain to officials the defense problems in the Philippines. Moreover,
MacArthur could, Eisenhower was sure, obtain favorable clarification of the
order to the Philippine Department mandating cooperation with the Mission.
Although Major General Lucius Holbrook had just assumed command of the
Philippine Department with orders stating "assistance to General MacArthur was
the most important peacetime mission of your command, "43 Eisenhower saw the
Philippine Department as obstructionist and had little confidence that the change
of commanders there would make a difference. Eisenhower wanted MacArthur to
speak to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Malin Craig and his civilian superior:
Jimmy [Ord] and I believe that if this whole matter were clearly
explained to the American Chief of Staff and Secretary ofWar, that
very substantial and effective assistance would be forthcoming. 44
For Eisenhower assistance would manifest itself in the form of weapons with which
to arm the Filipino army: even obsolete weapons would give the Philippines a
chance to defend themselves and inexpensively facilitate the American defense of
its colony. 45 But MacArthur refused to go to Washington in 1936. Ike was disappointed that his boss would shirk responsibility for the development of Philippine
defense at this crucial time; incredibly, MacArthur seemed more concerned about
his promotion to field marshal in the chimerical Philippine army than American
support for the Mission. Instead of traveling to Washington, MacArthur ordered
Eisenhower to prepare a paper that would explain to the War Department the
"efficiency and soundness of the Philippine Defense Plan, and the idea that the
and MacArthur's purpose in creating the Philippine army was to surreptitiously keep the Philippines indefinitely subservient to the United States as a manifestation of American Empire. This
interpretation does not bear scrutiny, and it certainly was not Eisenhower's view. For Eisenhower,
Philippine reliance on the United States for defense was the only logical strategic option in a
dangerous world, not a Qy.ezon-MacArthur plot to keep the Philippines a colony. For a recent
interpretation of this untenable view, see Richard B. Meixsel, "Manuel L. Quezon, Douglas
MacArthur, and the Significance of the Military Mission to the Philippine Commonwealth,"
Pacific Historical Review 70, no. 2 (2001): 255-92; Diary entry, 21 December 1937, in Holt and
Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 372.
43. Morton, Fall ofthe Philippines, 9.
44. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries,
307.
45. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in ibid., 307.
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American War Department should cooperate efficiently toward its development."46
MacArthur did not personally seek more U.S. assistance until the spring of 1937.
Clearly MacArthur did not perceive the same lack of progress, the same level
of threat to the Philippines that Eisenhower did. Moreover, to MacArthur, the
symbol of having a field marshal as the man responsible for Filipino defense was
worth much in terms of motivation and cooperation in the Philippines. Eisenhower
did not fully appreciate this view. He saw weapons as a greater priority. At the
base of this burgeoning disagreement was the notion, gradually taking hold of
MacArthur's mind, that the Filipinos could one day defend themselves. 47 1his
opinion was in keeping with MacArthur's analysis of what an aggressive Japan
might do. In a speech to the Command and General Staff School at Baguio in
August 1936 he said:
In the case of the Philippines, it would be an impossibility for any
potential enemy to bring to the Philippine area anything like a
preponderant portion of his army. He would indeed have difficulty
in concentrating into the vital area as large a force as the Philippine
Army which would oppose him. Any conceivable military force
might actually find itself outnumbered. 48
MacArthur even suggested that the island nature of the Philippines would help in
its defense. He seems to have discounted the advantage of the mobility a modern
industrial power would have in taking the Philippines, mobility the Filipinos would
not have. 49 MacArthur added later in the speech, "when the Philippine Defense
Plan had reached fruition, it will represent a defensive strength that will give hesitation to the strongest and most ruthless nation in the world." Finally, he asserted
the Philippines not only could thwart such a nation on its own but it must do so:
If the Philippines does not prepare for its own defense, to maintain
its own security and to preserve its own independence, how are
these functions to be performed? If others are not to perform these
functions for the Filipinos, certainly they must gird themselves for
the task. 50
Meanwhile, Eisenhower was convinced that the Filipinos could not defend themselves without significant American aid, far more aid than was forthcoming, aid that
would provide some basis in reality for MacArthur's grandiose vision. 51 It may well
be that both men were a bit delusional: Eisenhower concerning the amount of help
that might be secured from the United States, MacArthur regarding the capacity of
the Philippines to defend itself, and his assessment ofJapanese strategic logic.

46. Diary entries, 6 February, 1 March, and 29 May 1936, in ibid., 305,308,310.
47. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 95.
48. MacArthur, A Soldier Speaks, 101.
49. Ibid., 101.
50. MacArthur, A Soldier Speaks, 110.
51. Eisenhower, At Ease, 224; Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 307.
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Eisenhower's frustration with progress on the defense plan came to a head
at the same time as his dispute arose with MacArthur over the general's decision
to accept field marshal rank in the Philippine army. Eisenhower could not quietly
abide this manifestation of MacArthur's ego. The decision seemed full of selfimportance at the cost of more efficient defense. Unbeknownst to Eisenhower
at the time, MacArthur had negotiated this promotion with Qyezon before
accepting the job as Military Adviser. 52 But in early 1936, it appeared that
Qyezon was offering the promotion. Indeed Eisenhower, Ord, and Captain T. J.
Davis (MacArthur's aide) were also to receive promotions and commissions in the
Philippine army. Ike convinced Ord and Davis that accepting these promotions
would hinder the Mission's success. 53 Eisenhower confronted MacArthur, saying,
"General you have been a four-star general . . . This is a proud thing. Why in
the hell do you want a banana country giving you a field-marshalship?" But the
general "just gave me hell. "54 A seething Ike wrote in his diary:
In the first place, we [Eisenhower, Ord and Davis] believe that in
a locality where we are serving with so many American officers,
most of whom believe that the attempt to create a Philippine Army
is somewhat ridiculous, the acceptance by us of high rank in an
Army which is not yet formed would serve to belittle our effort.
Moreover, it would seriously handicap every effort on our part to
secure necessary cooperation from commanders and staffs in the
American Army. Secondly, we believe that in dealing with the
Philippine Army Headquarters our position is unassailable as long
as we purport to be nothing but assistants to the Military Adviser.
If, however, we should accept military titles in the Philippine Army,
the authority and soundness of our advice would be measured, in
the minds of the Philippine Army officers, by the rank held. We
believe this would create an anonymous [anomalous?] situation and
would handicap our efforts to assist, advise, and direct the efforts of
Army Headquarters and subordinate officials. 55
Here is Eisenhower's concern for the impact that a particular action might have
on the cooperation between the Philippine Department and the Philippine army,
and between the Mission and the army it was trying to create. For Eisenhower,
MacArthur's action would hurt the building of an effective team and a strong alliance. MacArthur hoped that his new rank would inspire the Filipinos to defend
their islands. But for Eisenhower, any action which hurt the creation of an effective team was contemptible. This idea, so much a part of Eisenhower's World War

52. Eisenhower, interview by James, p. 2.
53. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 'Ihe Prewar Diaries,
306.
54. Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait ofthe Hero, 81.
55. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf,Eisenhower: 'Ihe Prewar Diaries,
306,307.
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II philosophy, did not come to him
in the early days of that conflict,
but was derived from his days as a
football player at West Point and a
coach of army football teams in the
1920s, and most important, from
his mentor Fox Conner. 56 Eisenhower's Philippine sojourn, however, was crucial in the seasoning of
this philosophy in that it allowed
him to test his team concept in the
real world of competing military
branches and departments, political
infighting in his own government,
and in relations with a foreign culture and government. 57 MacArthur
simply failed to live up to what
Eisenhower thought an American
army officer should be.
There was also a significant T J Davis, Douglas MacArthur, and Dwight
difference between Eisenhower Eisenhower in dress uniform, Malacanang
and MacArthur regarding work Palace, Philippine Islands (Courtesy of the
ethic. The Amdrican army in the Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene,
Kansas]
Philippines, and indeed most
foreign posts, had developed a
lackadaisical attitude toward work. Eisenhower had run into this disturbing
tradition in Panama in the early 1920s and made himself somewhat unpopular
because of his insistence that officers take their jobs seriously.58 The American
army in the Philippines may have been still more lackadaisical. One lieutenant
colonel, writing in 1910, remembered fondly:
'
This post [Fort William McKinley] is like a big country club. A
little work in the morning. Golf, polo, tennis, riding in the hills in
the afternoon. The Club at sunset. Dinner in the evenings. A lazy
man's paradise.59

56. Stephen Ambrose, 1he Supreme Commander: 1he War Years of General Dwight D. Eisenhower (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), 55, 56. Ambrose cites his
interview of Eisenhower, 11 October 1967.
57. Diary entry, 15 February 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
306, 307; Ambrose, 1he Supreme Commander, 189; Pickett, Dwight David Eisenhower, 26.
58. Miller, Ike 1he Soldier, 209; Kenneth S. Davis, Dwight D. Eisenhower: Soldier of Democracy (New York: Konecky & Konecky, 1945), 192.
59. Coffman, 1he Regulars, 86.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The standards of the Philippine Department had hardly changed in twenty-five
years. MacArthur, perhaps because he saw himself as semi-retired, fit right in. 60
Eisenhower had to stand in the gap because of MacArthur's absences, accepting
responsibilities that would not normally be his. Among the duties MacArthur
shirked was meeting consistently with O!Iezon. Eisenhower wanted MacArthur
to meet with President O!Iezon at least once per week to secure agreement on the
myriad details facing the Mission, but the general refused. Eisenhower surmised
that MacArthur believed such meetings were beneath him. 61 Clearly Eisenhower
believed the Mission was suffering because of MacArthur's ego, the opposite of the
team approach that Ike favored. While Eisenhower sometimes enjoyed a leisurely
afternoon playing bridge, there were long periods of intense work in the brutal
tropical climate. 62 In MacArthur's absence, Ike, Ord, and the staff "had to run
much of the routine business."63 MacArthur and Eisenhower drifted apart as the
Mission struggled on.
Disputes between Eisenhower and MacArthur ranged over a wide array
of topics. Some, like the development of the Philippine army, were issues they
could affect if not completely control; others were entirely out of their spheres of
influence. In the summer of1936 they argued over Kansan AlfLandon's chances in
the presidential election. MacArthur, citing a Literary Digest poll, believed Landon
would win in November. Eisenhower, a Kansan with friends in his hometown of
Abilene who kept him apprised of politics and a host of other local topics, thought
Landon would not even carry his home state. Listening to one of MacArthur's
monologues on the election, Eisenhower disagreed with the general over Landon's
chances. MacArthur exploded, nearly hysterical; he blasted Eisenhower, who was
dumbfounded at this response. Then MacArthur let slip that he had informed
O!Iezon to shape his plans for a visit to the United States on the basis of a Landon
victory. In November 1936, Eisenhower was proved correct and MacArthur had
to "back pedal" to O!Iezon. But the general never apologized to Eisenhower. Ike
though the entire incident "most ridiculous. "64
The registration of twenty-year-old Filipino men went forward as planned in
April1936. The registration far exceeded O!Iezon's hopes; the president was proud
60. Even D. Clayton James admits MacArthur kept light office hours. Richard Connaughton is less circumspect. James, 1he Years of MacArthur, 557; Arthur Nevins Oral History Interview, 23 April1970, p. 7, OH 119, EL; Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 72; Eisenhower, At
Ease, 228; D'Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier's Lift, 240; Eisenhower, interview by James, p. 4.
61. Diary entry, 29 May (second entry) 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 311; Eisenhower, At Ease, 228.
62. Nevins interview, p. 7; Dwight Eisenhower to Mother and Dad (John and Elivera
Doud), 10 January 1938, Hle: Doud Family, Box 10, Family Correspondence Series, Mamie
Eisenhower Papers, EL; Dwight Eisenhower to Folks (John and Elivera Doud), 14 September
1939, EL; Eisenhower, General Ike, 26.
63. Eisenhower, interview by James, p. 4.
64. Diary entry, 26 September 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 328; Diary entry, 15 November 1936, in ibid., 329.
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of his Filipino brothers. 65 Qyezon decided, so MacArthur told Eisenhower, to
draft and train the full 20,000-man contingent beginning in January 193 7. 66 1he
20,000 figure was the target number for a fully operational training system. The
defense plan did not envision reaching that number until1941. 67 In fact, under
the original plan only 3,000 recruits were to be called inJanuary. 68
When MacArthur informed Eisenhower of the decision to train 20,000
recruits at the beginning of the year, Eisenhower was incensed. He explained to
MacArthur there was no money to build the training infrastructure for so many
recruits, there was no money to pay them, and there were too few instructors
to train them. In fact, the sites for the training camps had not been selected.
Eisenhower even had doubts that 20,000 recruits could be fed. Then MacArthur
launched into Eisenhower with one of his venomous tirades, a show Eisenhower
had already seen all too often. 69 MacArthur and Qyezon were thinking in terms
of"generalities"; it was Eisenhower's and Ord's job to take care of the details. 70
The "details" were daunting. The 1936 defense budget was already gone; the
money for the construction of training facilities awaited special funding from the
National Assembly. Even that request did not envision training 40,000 men in 1937.
Eisenhower estimated the overall cost of the additional men to the ten-year plan at
10 million pesos, more than one year's budget. Ike knew what real training required.
He had significant experience training soldiers, even officers, in World War I. 71
MacArthur's program seemed all about show, little about substance. 72 But what
could Eisenhower do? MacArthur and Qyewn, it seemed, were of one mind; there
was nothing left but to do one's duty. Then too, the general still had some impact on
Eisenhower's imagination. Ike later remembered, "General MacArthur's amazing
determination and optimism made us forget these questions [expense and efficacy
of the defense program] at times, but they kept corning back in our rninds."73
65.Jose, 1he Philippine Army, 1935-1942,55.
66. Ibid., 55; Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 60; Diary of the American Military
Mission in the Philippine Islands, 29 May (first entry) 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower:
1he Prewar Diaries, 309.Jose and Connaughton assert that the decision to train the full20,000man contingent was Qyezon's. Eisenhower thought it was MacArthur's. It may have been either
way but clearly both men agreed, and Eisenhower received the news through MacArthur. I
suspect that Eisenhower is essentially correct: MacArthur convinced Qyezon of the wisdom
of training 20,000 men in January 1937. Indeed, MacArthur seems to have been considering
increasing the number of recruits since at least January 1936.
67. Diary entry, December 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
371.
68. Diary entry, 29 May (first entry) 1936, in ibid., 309.
69. Diary entry, 20 January (second entry) 1936, in ibid., 304; Diary entry, 29 May (second
entry) 1936, in ibid., 311.
70. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 60.
71. Eisenhower, At Ease, 131-33; Miller, Ike the Soldier, 166,167.
72. Diary entry, 20 January (second entry) 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he
Prewar Diaries, 304.
73. James, 1he Years ofMacArthur, 509.
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Eisenhower's frustration grew over the development of the training program
and the way his boss led the Mission. Ike noted in his diary that the "hasty way
we went at the job [out of necessity given the MacArthur decision to train 20,000
men in January] boosted costs, which, even without the aggravation [of training
more men] are much higher than we originally estimated."74 Moreover, most of
the camps lacked adequate water, roads, and light. A weary Eisenhower lamented,
"most of our stations will not be ready for receipt of recruits in January. "75 He and
Ord remained convinced the plan "emphasizes strength and numbers too much
at the expense of efficiency."The training offered at the camps would be far below
the quality Eisenhower deemed essential, and the cost would overwhelm the 16
million peso budget. Ike again took these problems to MacArthur. This time the
general acknowledged the cost overruns, but preferred to pressure Qlezon to
come up with the money. Eisenhower was to plod ahead with the program. 76
The military training provided during the five-and-one-half-month program
was necessarily shallow. 77 1his was due in part to the lack of funds, but also because
the recruits had to be taught so much more than soldiering. Half of them were
illiterate so the army endeavored to teach them rudimentary reading skills. There
were also courses on sanitation; nevertheless, 52 recruits died of disease in the first
half of 1937. One observer wrote:
General MacArthur, must have his tongue in his cheek when he
sounds off about them or else he does not visit the training camps.
I have visited a few here in the provinces. The state of affairs is
indescribable. They put a poor miserable third lieutenant, with at
the most six months training, in charge of several hundred of these
savages who have never known a moment's restraint nor discipline
in their lives ... they have no common language, it was quite
impossible. 78
As Eisenhower had feared, there were not enough qualified instructors. Nevertheless, over 19,000 trainees "graduated" in May 1937.79
In the summer of 1937, Eisenhower inherited Ord's responsibility for the
Philippine army budget while Ord was in Washington, D.C., attempting to
garner greater cooperation from the United States in building Philippine defenses.
Eisenhower, concerned since the beginning that the defense plan emphasized
sheer numbers over quality and efficiency, pointed out to MacArthur that the
budget provided only 1 million pesos for mobilization equipment such as tents
74. Diary entry, Christmas 1936, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries,
329.
75. Diary entry, Christmas 1936, in ibid., 329.
76. Ibid., 329.
77.Jose, The Philippine Army, 1935-1942,79.
78. Letter from a British manager of a sugar ~state, 25 August 193 7, Hie: Philippine Islands, Box 154, Pre-Presidential, 1916-1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, EL.
79.Jose, The Philippine Army, 1935-1942,78,79.
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and mess kits. 80 An alarmed MacArthur surprised Eisenhower with an order
to add 3.5 million pesos to the budget for such equipment. Failure to supply
recruits with these implements, MacArthur intoned, would "defeat his whole
plan." 81 Eisenhower, surprised by MacArthur's impractical reaction, !'objected
strenuously" to the added expense. He wondered where he might find the money
and what the implications for training would be. Ike was not opposed to the
decision on the basis of merit; the army should always have been supplied with
such equipment, and trained fewer men. But now MacArthur was demanding a
quick reorientation of the budget without commensurate savings. MacArthur met
Eisenhower's objections with the view that this budget change was imperative for
psychological reasons. Eisenhower then reworked the budget to save 1.5 million
pesos. In presenting the new plan, Ike warned MacArthur that the potential for
running out of funds and being forced to lay off recruits and officers before the end
of 1938 was real. 82 Meanwhile, Eisenhower requested mobilization equipment
from the United States. 83
Unfortunately for all concerned, the mobilization equipment dispute was
minor compared to the fact that the Philippine army was simply out of money by
mid-1937. 84 Nor could the principals take comfort in the midst of the budget crisis
in the hope that the world would leave the Philippine Islands alone, enjoying an era
of peace and prosperity while moving sonorously to independence. The Philippines
were precariously located on the fringe of shifting empires and thus were an inviting
target. 85 In July 1937, the Japanese invaded northern China, involving that unhappy
land in both a civil war and a war against a modern imperial nation. The Philippines
were far too close to the Land of the Rising Sun to rest easily.
The Philippine army sought a special appropriation from the National
Assembly in the summer of 1937 to cover its deficit. Meanwhile Eisenhower,
with Ord still in the States, set out to write a 1938 budget that would pay for
MacArthur's defense plan. Eisenhower's final figure was 25 million pesos, 9 million
more than the figure MacArthur had promised Qyezon in 1935. 86 In discussing the
defense plan with the general over the previous months, Eisenhower consistently
asserted that there was not enough money. MacArthur assured Eisenhower that
world conditions, the Filipinos' desire for early independence, and perhaps money
from the United States would all work in favor of the new budget; if not, he
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would demand more money from the Filipinos. 87 Ord, having returned to the
Philippines in the fall, told Qyezon of the new budget. Qyezon was apoplectic
and confronted MacArthur who feigned ignorance of the escalating costs. 88 The
next day MacArthur called a conference of his aides; Ord, Eisenhower, Davis, and
Bonner Fellers, who was to report to Qyezon, attended. MacArthur asserted he
had never authorized a budget over 16 million pesos, and that the new budget
made him look like "a fool or a knave." 89 MacArthur continued the tirade,
accusing his staff of"'arguing technicalities' to defeat the conceptions of the high
command."90 However, the primary cost problems were MacArthur's decision to
train the full40,000 men in 1937, and the general's grand desire to have a reserve
army of thirty divisions. 91 As MacArthur ranted; Eisenhower seethed. Later that
same day he wrote:
I've got to decide soon whether I can go much further with a
person who, either consciously or unconsciously, deceives his boss,
his subordinates and himself (probably) so incessantly as he does.
I wonder whether he believes there is one atom of truth in his
statements of this morning. I wonder whether egotism, exclusive
devotion to one's own interests (in this case a 66,000 Peso salary, plus
penthouse and expenses) can finally completely eliminate a person's
perception of honesty, straightforwardness, and responsibility to
the Philippines for whom he is working.
Having confronted the human condition in his relationship with MacArthur,
Eisenhower considered his future:
For some months, I've remained on this job, not because of the
General, but in spite of him. I've got interested in this riddle of
whether or not we can develop a W.D. [War Department] and
an army capable of running itself, and I prefer to dig away at it to
being on a "mark time" basis somewhere else. But now I am at a
cross road. If the Marshal is to persist in his arbitrary methods, and
is going to make things as unpleasant, if not impossible as today's
homily indicated, then I'm for home. We should be able to get
a better line on the situation within a few days! Right now I am
disgusted and in something of a temper, a bad state of mind in
which to make any decisions. 92
Here in these passages are many ofthe qualities ofmind that Eisenhower admired
in an army officer: the elevation of duty above one's own interests, willingness to take
responsibility for problems or failure, and determination to make hard decisions
87. Diary entry, 8 October 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries,
361,362.
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89. Ibid., 360,361.
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and to make them in a calm and objective manner, not on the basis of theories or
wild imaginings. MacArthur, for Eisenhower, was the opposite of what a leader
should be.These personality traits were already well established in Eisenhower, but
his island sojourn with MacArthur emotionally and powerfully imbedded them still
deeper in his mind. Ike knew there was little sense of"team'' in the Mission, or in the
relationship between the Mission and the U.S. Army, still less between the United
States and the Philippines. MacArthur had indelibly impressed upon Eisenhower,
through negative example, the necessity for a commander to accept responsibility
for his actions and decisions. MacArthur could not admit to mistakes and so blamed
aides when he made them. This MacArthurian character trait was often on Ike's
mind while in the Philippines. In writing Lucius Clay's efficiency report in 1938
Eisenhower noted, "Willingly assumes responsibility.'>93 Moreover, MacArthur
would dramatically repeat the lesson before Eisenhower left the Philippines.
The general now found himself in an uncomfortable position. He had denied
the realistic budget to Qyezon, and verbally bludgeoned his aides over it. But
the crisis was real, and MacArthur could not escape it in his penthouse or at the
movies, a pastime he so enjoyed. 94 In spite of the fact that he would appear to be
a functionary of his aides, at some point he decided to use all of the arguments he
had rehearsed in front of Eisenhower to convince Qyezon that the new budget
was necessary. The president would have been a "fool or a knave" if he had not now
entertained doubts about his military adviser.95
Qyezon, as egotistical and ambitious as MacArthur, was neither fool nor knave.
But he too was faced with a difficult choice: disavow MacArthur and stick with the
original plan, or ask the National Assembly for more money using MacArthur's
arguments. Qyezon would need a compelling argument for the Assembly, some
of whom believed the whole plan was wrong-headed, that the Philippines were
indefensible. MacArthur and Qyezon turned to Eisenhower to draft the speech. 96
This was no surprise; if one quality could be singled out in explaining how
Eisenhower had made a name for himself in the U.S. Army, it was his ability to
think and write clearly. In the 1920s he had written the Guide to American Battle
Monuments in France for General John J. Pershing when others had failed; in the
early 1930s he had written the nation's first comprehensive industrial mobilization
plan for General Moseley. Again, others had failed. This stellar work brought him
to the attention of Chief of Staff MacArthur, who soon put Eisenhower to work
on numerous writing projects, including his annual report. 97 Now Ike set out to
convince the Filipino legislature to increase the defense budget.

93. Jean Edward Smith, Lucius D. Clay (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1990), 76.
94. Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: 1he Philippine Years, 187.
95. Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat, 95, 96, 97.
96. Memorandum to the Military Adviser, 13 October 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf,Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries, 364-67
97. Kerry Irish, "Dwight Eisenhower and the 1930 Industrial Mobilization Plan," journal
ofMilitary History 70, no.1 (January 2006): 60, 61.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Eisenhower's draft of Qyezon's speech emphasized the deteriorating
world conditions, the Filipino desire for early independence (thus the necessity
for a greater defensive capability), and the escalating costs of raw materials. 98
Eisenhower also noted that more of the defense budget than originally planned
was being spent on sanitation education, literacy, and vocational training. He also
assured the nervous legislators that the standing army, a point of contention, had
actually been reduced, and that the defense budget would not unduly impinge
upon the people. He wrote:
Furthermore, regardless of the aggregate authorized for the full
development of our National Defense, the annual appropriation
will be adjusted each year to the annual revenue, so that all other
authorized government services and activities may develop in
harmony with the growth of the population and the expansion of
our culture. 99
Clearly, if anything about the paragraph may be said to be clear, Eisenhower
intended to leave the impression that the defense budget would not unduly encumber the Filipino people. What is interesting about the paragraph was that his ability
to use words to obfuscate, so remarked upon while president, was not accidental but
calculated; this talent was well established and useful during his Philippine years. 100
Moreover this paragraph subtly describes Eisenhower's governmental philosophy;
he did not think the military budget of the Philippines should be as large as it had
become, and, even more important, that the Mission should not spend more than
its budget allowed. 101 Human services and defense should have some sort of harmony. For Eisenhower, the Filipinos could not defend themselves. 102 The United
States was supposed to address deficiencies. MacArthur preferred to press the
Filipino government to spend more money on defense.
Although the budget increase was approved, the army had to make sacrifices. 103
MacArthur's dream of thirty reserve divisions had to be scrapped for a more realistic
fifteen-division plan. 104 And MacArthur apparently realized that he had seriously
offended his right-hand man. The general decided to officially make Eisenhower
his chief of staff. 105 That was fine with Ike, but it did not mollifY him. He insisted
that MacArthur delineate his responsibilities and clarifY the organizational chart
of the Mission. Indeed, Eisenhower wrote his own duties and asked MacArthur
98. Memorandum to the Military Adviser, 13 October 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: lbe Prewar Diaries, 364-67.
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Diary entry, 21 December 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: lbe Prewar Diaries, 370-72.
102. Eisenhower, At Ease, 225.
103.James, lbe Years ofMacArthur, 518.
104. Diary entry, 14 October (second entry) 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: lbe
Prewar Diaries, 368.
105. Diary entry, 15 October 1937, in ibid., 367.
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to sign off on the list. This is not the behavior of a man confident in the wisdom
of his boss, or intimidated by him. MacArthur signed off. 106
This decision to make Eisenhower chief of staff occurred at the same time
that MacArthur decided to retire from the American army, which had ordered
him to return to the United States to accept a clearly subordinate command of
a corps area under Chief of Staff Malin Craig. MacArthur preferred his field
marshal rank to the two stars he would wear in the U.S. Army. 107 In August 1937,
when MacArthur had received news of his recall, Eisenhower endured another
MacArthurian rage against his enemies in the War Department, foremost among
them, the army chief of staff. 108 Surely the "Chaumont crowd" had torpedoed
his Mission and was jealously bent on reducing his stature. 109 Craig was in fact
opposed to MacArthur's recall, but the decision was out of his hands. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt had decided. MacArthur did have political enemies, former
High Commissioner Frank Murphy among them, who apparently believed his
pronouncements, activities, and influence with the Philippine people in building a
national defense system were helping to destabilize that region. 110
For our purposes, it is Eisenhower's response to MacArthur's decision that
is instructive. Ike tried to keep MacArthur from reacting impetuously without
knowing who or what was behind the decision. Far from being too pliant to
confront MacArthur, or anyone else for that matter, Eisenhower's circumspect and
balanced mind considered alternative scenarios to the general's conspiracy theory
and offered these in an effort to conciliate, to unify, as opposed to inflaming conflict.
Surely General Craig was an "honorable person," Ike argued. 111 For Eisenhower it
was always the team, the Mission, the defense of the United States that mattered.
But failure to fully empathize with MacArthur's sufferings inevitably brought his
wrath upon the voice of calm in his midst. Eisenhower wrote:
Every time one of these tempests in a teapot sweeps the office,
I find myself, sooner or later, bearing the brunt of the General's
displeasure, which always manifests itself against anyone who
fails to agree in toto with his theories and hypotheses. [underline
Eisenhower's] no matter how astounding they may be. These comic
106. Diary entry, 15 October 1937, in ibid., 367, 368; see footnote 1 in diary for further
information.
107. Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years, 190.
108. Diary entry, 25 August 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries,
355.
109.1he "Chaumont crowd" was ostensibly a clique of officers who had served in General
Pershing's headquarters at Chaumont, France, during World War I and were determined to
undermine MacArthur; Diary entry, 25 August 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The
Prewar Diaries, 355 and footnote 1. Eisenhower denied that such a clique existed. See Eisenhower, interview by James, p. 6.
110. Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years, 189, 190.
111. Diary entry, 25 August 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries,
355.
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opera wars never center around any problem incident to the job we
are on. They invariably involve something personal to the Gen.; I
could be the fair-haired boy if I'd only yes, yes, yes!! That would be
so easy, too!! 112
In his assessment of this tempest Eisenhower entertained the thought that he was
complicit in MacArthur's rages, a notion that could only have fueled his determination to leave MacArthur: "The chief assistant to the Genl.... has become a (or
maybe always has been) a master bootlicker. "113
Even Clayton James, MacArthur's sympathetic biographer, wrote that
MacArthur's decision to retire hurt the Mission because that institution was
folded into the Philippine Department, its voice thus muffled in bureaucracy. 114
Eisenhower bitterly lamented that MacArthur's ego and greed had hurt the
Mission and that the general had made the decision to retire in order to protect
his salary and emoluments:
From the beginning Jim and I have been practically isolated in
thought, attitude, and intention. We did not want to come to the
P.I. but were willing to do so because we thought we would have
a wonderful professional opportunity. Once on the job we have
concerned ourselves with trying to develop for this government and
country the best possible army with the means at hand. We have
been beset on all sides by difficulties arising from personal ambition,
personal glorification, personal selfishness of the hot shot (66,000
pesos a year and a penthouse), [MacArthur] etc., etc. When we have
objected strenuously to measures which we believe unwise such as
the Field Marshal-ship, the 1937 calling of20,000 trainees, the 1938
boosting of the budget; we've been finally told to shut up. 115
For Eisenhower, all of the above decisions were a manifestation of MacArthur's
ego, his selfishness. Moreover, they compromised the defense of the United States
in the Far East and were thus unforgivable. In addition to Eisenhower's disdain for
MacArthur's behavior, he continued to disagree with the general's budget. Not only
was it unwisely raised, but it also wasted money on areas that offered poor returns.
Worst of all, MacArthur spent more money than he had. The Philippines could not
afford MacArthur's program. 116 Eisenhower feared this ongoing financial problem
was a brewing crisis that might boil over in 1939; he wrote, "sooner or later there
must be a day of reckoning." 117 Eisenhower believed more effort should have been

112.lbid., 355, 356.
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115. Diary entry, 21 December 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 372.
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117. Diary entry, 21 December 1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 371.
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made to secure equipment, money, and cooperation from the United States. It was
clear to Ike that the Filipinos could not defend themselves. The United States must
offer more help. MacArthur's trip to the United States to secure that help had been
both delayed and ineffective; Ord had achieved some real results but not enough. 118
In 1938 Eisenhower would try his hand at securing American aid.
Disgusted as Ike was with MacArthur's budget, the next blow-up with him almost
sent Eisenhower home. Always enamored with theater and prestige, MacArthur
decided to parade his growing army down the streets of Manila. The general hoped
that when the Filipinos saw what a grand force their money was buying, their
morale would be boosted and they would begin to believe, as many did not, that they
could defend themselves. But such a parade would cost an enormous sum. Qyezon
discovered MacArthur's plans and asked Eisenhower about them. An astonished
Eisenhower, who had assumed Qyezon knew all about the parade, informed the
president. Qyezon grew angry. He called MacArthur and voiced his displeasure while
Eisenhower returned to his office. The general again blamed his subordinates for
exceeding his orders, subordinates who had told him there was no money for such
a display. MacArthur's massive ego, his belief that he was a man of destiny, would
not permit him to admit a mistake.l 19 MacArthur told Qyezon that he had merely
suggested a study be done on the idea. This interpretation of what had happened was
"certainly news to us," Eisenhower wrote. Once again MacArthur had refused to
accept responsibility for a mistake. Three decades later Ike recalled the impact of this
event on him: "This misunderstanding caused considerable resentment-and never
again were we on the same warm and cordial terms."120 Though Ike's son John argues
that his father's rift with MacArthur has been overblown, he admits that the most
important thing Ike learned from MacArthur was to accept "blame for failure" while
"giving credit for success to others." 121 These disagreements with MacArthur often
ended in a heated exchange; Eisenhower remembered, "Probably no one had tougher
fights with a senior man than I did with MacArthur. I told him time and again, 'Why
in the hell don't you fire me? Goddammit, you do things I don't agree with and you
know damn well I don't."'122 As historian Carlo D'Este has noted, such an outburst
risked his career.123 Men do not take such chances, or exchange such words, without
lasting resentment. Both men hid their antipathy well, but it was real. Eisenhower later
told Robert Eichelberger, who served under MacArthur during World War II, that
the parade incident was the end of his respect for MacArthur. 124
118.Jose, 7he Philippine Army, 1935-1942, 99; Dwight Eisenhower to James Ord, 29 July
1937, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 345-48.
119. Eisenhower, interview by James, 3, 5.
120. Eisenhower, At Ease, 225, 226; Jose, 7he Philippine Army, 1935-1942, 98; Connaughton, MacArthur and Deftat, 81; James, 7he Years ofMacArthur, 526.
121. Eisenhower, General Ike, 34.
122. D'Este, Eisenhower: A Soldier's Life, 239.
123. Ibid., 239,240.
124. Unpublished memoir by Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, Eichelberger Papers, U.S.
Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., as cited in D'Este,Eisenhower:A Soldier's
Life,254.
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A far worse and more personal blow soon followed. Jimmy Ord died in a plane
crash in late January 1938 while attempting to fly into Baguio. Eisenhower felt
Ord's death more than any other non-family loss ofhis life. He wrote ofOrd:
Many people have lost a close companion and an intimate friend.
I've lost this, also my right hand, and my partner on a tough job,
who furnished most of the inspiration needed to keep me plugging
away. With him gone much of the zest has departed from a job that
we always tackled as a team, never as two individuals. 125
Even in the midst of deep personal grief, Eisenhower noted the loss to the team.
In the summer of 1938 Eisenhower and his family would travel home to
visit friends and relatives, and to get a break from the Philippine climate. He
would also journey all the way to Washington, D.C., where he hoped to convince
the War Department to more substantially help defend the Philippines. 126 But
before Ike left for home, he once again experienced the vicissitudes of working
for MacArthur.
The general again disrupted the budget by returning to his dream of training
large numbers of men at the expense of equipment and efficiency. But he also
adopted a more conciliatory attitude toward his top aide, listening carefully to
Eisenhower's views and actually following some of his advice. MacArthur even
remarked to Eisenhower that "nothing that occurs around here with respect to
you is to be considered a precedent. In all respects you represent a special case, and
it is my hope to keep you here a long time." Eisenhower was so astonished by the
apparently long-lasting change that he wrote, "The atmosphere has cleared to such
an extent that this job, at long last, has become personally agreeable to me as well
as professionally interesting." 127
Meanwhile Qyezon and Eisenhower found several opportunities to discuss the
army. The two men increasingly respected each other and found themselves chatting
frequently, partly because MacArthur did not place a high priority on conversation
with the Filipino president. Eventually Eisenhower and Qyezon discussed their
philosophies of government and other subjects. Eisenhower explained his views
on taxes, education, and ethics, and Qyezon did likewise. MacArthur learned of
these discussions and of the growing respect between the two men and was not
pleased. Indeed Qyezon may have inadvertently precipitated the general's jealousy
when he sought to raise Eisenhower's Filipino pay by 1,000 pesos per month and
improve his living quarters. MacArthur now ordered Eisenhower to ignore many of
the president's invitations. By the time Eisenhower returned from his stateside trip,
MacArthur's attitude toward him had hardened still further. But that was in the
future. For the moment, Ike was hoping his trip home, with his wife, Mamie, and
125. Diary entry, 15 February 1938, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
376.
126. Eisenhower, At Ease, 228.
127. Diary entry, 18 June 1938, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 1he Prewar Diaries,
383, 384.
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John alongside, would provide both rest for himself and progress for the Mission.
The Eisenhowers left for home in June 1938 aboard the Coolidge. 128
Eventually Ike made his way to Washington. One scholar has argued that
Eisenhower was disappointed with the response he received from the War
Department, that his entreaties were largely unsuccessful as the War Department
was still hostile to the idea of providing arms to the Philippines. 129 But Ord's trip
in 1937 had persuaded some that the Mission was doing important work, this in
spite of rumors in Washington that the Mission's officers were unpopular among
Filipinos, that the Philippines might be granted independence in 1939, and
continued opposition to the Mission from a few officers in the War Department. 130
Nevertheless, by rnid-1938 the situation in the War Department had changed to
a more favorable view of MacArthur's Mission. Eisenhower was actually pleased
with the results of his trip.B 1 Writing to MacArthur from Denver, Colorado, Ike
reported:
I feel that my Washington trips were very successful, and I obtained
much information on the mortar question ... All the people I
talked to in the War Department feel that you are making much
more progress out there than they originally believed possible. They
have become convinced [largely because of Eisenhower] that you
are doing a worthwhile job, and in a fine way. 132
The Eisenhowers returned to Manila on 5 November 1938. Ike quickly
discovered that the improved work relationship he had had with MacArthur in
the few weeks before he left on his Washington trip had ended. In his absence,
MacArthur had reorganized his staff, eliminated the chief of staff position that
Eisenhower had so capably filled, and essentially marginalized Ike. Eisenhower was
to be in charge of plans, training, and mobilization, but was not to run the Mission
as he had been doing, and was not to have any official liaison role to Qtezon. Before
Eisenhower had left for the United States, some Filipino legislators had talked
about getting rid of MacArthur and asking Eisenhower to be the military adviser.
MacArthur, prone to believe in conspiracies-particularly if they seemed directed
against him-learned of this maneuvering and was convinced that Eisenhower
was behind the movement. MacArthur now saw Eisenhower as disloyal and
decided to reduce his responsibilities while retaining a lasting contempt for
his subordinate. Ike believed MacArthur had rearranged his duties specifically
128. Diary entry, 6 April1938, in ibid., 380; Eisenhower, At Ease, 228.
129. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier, General ofthe Army, President Elect, 110.
130.Jim Ord to Dwight Eisenhower,27 June 1937, 18July 1937,and 17 August 1937, Hle:
OLN-ORG (misc.), Box 87, Pre-Presidential, 1916-1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, EL.
131. Dwight Eisenhower to General Douglas MacArthur, 16 September 1938, in Holt
and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 399-401; Diary entry, 19 September 1938, in
ibid.,402.
132. Dwight Eisenhower to Douglas MacArthur, 30 September 1938, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: The Prewar Diaries, 408. Eisenhower actually made two trips to Washington,
D.C., from Denver, Colorado.
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in order to keep him from seeing Qyezon. Eisenhower suspected MacArthur
was afraid that he was losing "face" with Qyezon and that Ike was growing in
stature. Eisenhower was correct that MacArthur feared losing Qyezon's respect.
But MacArthur should have known that Eisenhower had nothing to do with the
maneuverings of a few Filipino politicians. Indeed, when Ike learned of this plot
he confronted those involved, saying that unless they dropped the idea he would
request a transfer home. 133
Eisenhower wished he had never returned to the islands and bitterly
castigated MacArthur in his diary, calling him a "d--- fool." MacArthur was
equally venomous, calling Eisenhower a "traitor" (to MacArthur). Ike saw that
those who did best with MacArthur were willing to flatter his imperial ego: "He'd
like to occupy a throne room surrounded by experts in flattery."Ike was particularly
galled that MacArthur had made these moves behind his back; he was determined
now to leave MacArthur and the Philippines and even regretted the "campaign
I conducted in the States to make him appear a wise counselor, an asset to the
Philippines, and splendid man in his present post." Eisenhower had made these
arguments in the sincere hope that more American aid and improving policies in
the Philippine Mission, no doubt under his own influence, would lead to a better
defense plan for the Philippines. Now, whatever aid came to the Philippines would
not be used as it should be. More than ever, the general was determined to build
his thirty-division reserve army, even at the expense of any semblance of a regular
army other than a general staff and training cadres. Eisenhower lamented that
MacArthur was "willing to scuttle anything and everything real. Will I be glad
when I get out of this!!"134 Moreover, the essential communication between the
Mission and Qyezon, given MacArthur's aloofness and lackadaisical work routine,
would no doubt decline.l3 5 Nevertheless, Eisenhower was determined that his
disappointment not show, that it not hurt the Mission. He wrote, "On the surface
all is lovely, I will not give him the satisfaction of showing any resentment." 136
Perhaps this is why John Eisenhower, Ike's son, downplays the rupture between
MacArthur and his father; the latter hid his anger well. 137
In the midst of this upheaval, Eisenhower wrote to Major Mark Clark
confirming his desire, mentioned in an earlier meeting with Clark during
133. Smith, Lucius D. Clay, 80, 81. Smith quotes his own interview with Clay.
134. Diary entry, in 10 November 1938, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar
Diaries, 410; Diary entry, 12 December 1938, in ibid., 413; Connaughton, MacArthur and Defeat,
84; Schaller, Douglas MacArthur, 40; Charles H . Bogart, uThe Doomed Philippine Seas Defense
Project,"Journal ofthe Council on America's Military Past 14, no.1 (1986): 37-44. Bogart explains
that there was not enough money to place thirty-one large artillery pieces properly from 1939 to
1941. Most of these guns never fired a shot at the Japanese.
135. Diary entry, 10 November 1938, in Holt and Leyerzapf,Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 410; Diary entry, 9 March 1939, in ibid., 423.
136. Diary entry, 10 November 1938, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 410, 411.
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Eisenhower's trip to the United States, to leave the Philippines. He asked Clark if
it were possible to be assigned to the Third Division at Fort Lewis, Washington.
Clark worked toward this goal. 138
MacArthur's scheme to separate Eisenhower and Qyezon failed, and Ike's
decision to leave ran into both Qyezon's admiration for him and army red tape.
Qyezon and Eisenhower saw each other frequently. They both enjoyed playing
bridge and conversation. 139 Qyezon pleaded with him to stay in the Philippines
and provided him emoluments that irritated MacArthur. 140 The U.S. Army
informed Eisenhower that his tour would not end until February 1940; the four
months Eisenhower spent in the United States did not count toward the four-year
overseas tour. 141 For his part MacArthur seems to have forgotten his ill-usage of
Eisenhower. Though he had told Ike he was "free to seek other assignments if he
chose,"inJanuary of1939 he indicated his hope that Eisenhower would ask for an
extension of his tour of three months. Eisenhower was surprised. 142
Meanwhile, Qyezon's and MacArthur's priorities separated. 143 Severe labor
unrest and political instability led Qyezon to divert defense funds to the Constabulary,
which had once again been separated from the Philippine army in late 1938. 144
MacArthur ranted against Qyezon for every slight and indiscretion, while Qyezon's
doubt of MacArthur's defense plan deepened. 145 In agreement with Eisenhower,
Qyezon believed that only the United States could defend the Philippines and that
it had the responsibility to do so until independence was granted. 146 He further
accurately believed that there was little indication that it would do so effectively.
In early 1940, after Eisenhower had left, MacArthur admitted that defense of the
Philippines was the "ultimate responsibility" of the United States. The Philippine
defense force was but a reserve for the U.S. Army. 147
In March 1939 Eisenhower had the opportunity to give the commencement
address to the graduating Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) class at the
University of the Philippines. This speech reveals the mature thought of Dwight
138. Diary entry, 10 October 1938, in Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries,
409; Daniel Holt, "An Unlikely Partnership and Service: Dwight Eisenhower, Mark Clark, and
the Philippines," Kansas History 13 (Autumn, 1990): 158,159.
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Eisenhower on the profession of arms. Preparation was one of the cherished
ideals that Eisenhower spoke of that day. For Eisenhower, a young officer prepares
himself through study and field exercises to be the best soldier possible. Each
officer must cultivate the characteristics that would ensure his own success and
that of the army: loyalty to superiors and subordinates, honesty, fairness, and "he
must learn to make firm decisions and to accept responsibility for them without
seeking to shift it either to superior or subordinate." 148 It was up to each individual
to pursue this course.
Finally, Eisenhower asserted, the soldier must be subject to the civilian
government. It was not his lot to get involved in the policies of that government,
to complain, to disobey its dictates. He was explicit on this point:
As members of the Reserve Officers Training Corps you are
primarily citizens, and secondarily soldiers. In the first of these
capacities you enjoy all the rights and privileges of any other citizen;
in the other you are compelled to forego such of those rights and
privileges as involve participation in the political activities, decisions
and policies of your nation. This distinction must be meticulously
observed, because, in a democracy, the military is and must remain
subordinate to civil power. 149
Too many times had Eisenhower seen MacArthur involve himself in political matters, attempting to supersede the civilian authority. From the 1932 Bonus March,
in which MacArthur ignored President Herbert Hoover's orders, to his attempt to
force the Philippine government to spend more on defense, MacArthur powerfully inserted himself in civilian politics. 150 This was MacArthur's way; it was not

148. Dwight Eisenhower's Address to the Reserve Officers' Training Corps, 24 March
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president's basic humanitarian views regarding the Bonus Army. In the midst of the conflict,
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MacArthur to refrain from crossing the Anacostia Bridge. Eisenhower himself told the general
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those orders or not. He knew that new orders from the president were at hand and chose to
ignore that fact. MacArthur believed Hoover did not fully appreciate the threat to the United
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Eisenhower's. 151 Indeed, MacArthur's behavior was contrary to the cherished ideals
of the U.S. Army. Most army officers did not even vote; Eisenhower meticulously
followed this tradition.t52
Ike's talks and bridge games with Qyezon continued. On the evening of 28
March 1939, Qyezon called Eisenhower to Malacanang, the presidential palace.
The president was disturbed over a problem with a General Staff letter, and
problems with the officer corps. During the course of the conversation, Qyezon
was astonished to learn that Eisenhower was no longer MacArthur's chief of staff.
The conversation further revealed that it had been MacArthur's idea to train the
full complement of reservists in 1937, as opposed to spending money on officers
and trainers and a more well-rounded military, and to make MacArthur a field
marshal. Of course MacArthur had maintained that these decisions had come
from Qyezon. Now it was apparent to Eisenhower that MacArthur had simply
lied. Before the conversation ended, Qyezon promised to have Eisenhower reinstated, if it were possible, as liaison between himself and the Mission. It took
some time, but eventually MacArthur's unwillingness to communicate regularly
with the government led a frustrated Secretary of Defense Jorge Vargas to insist
that Eisenhower be reappointed to his old liaison job; MacArthur acquiesced. 153
As we have seen, Ike was determined to leave MacArthur and the Philippines
once the general had removed him from his role as chief of staff. Even before
this Eisenhower had vacillated between his interesting and challenging job in the
Philippines and his longing to serve with troops, to obtain a field command. As
the likelihood of war approached, and his disgust with MacArthur increased, that
decision was constantly receiving confirmation.
In May, Major Clark delivered for Eisenhower. 154 Ike never forgot the favor,
and Clark would benefit from it in the years ahead. Ike's new orders directed him
to the 15th Infantry at Fort Lewis, Washington, effective no later than November
1939. 155
Eisenhower was ecstatic, Qyezon did not want Eisenhower to leave and literally
offered him a blank check to stay. Many other Filipinos shared that sentiment. 156
Eisenhower had turned down better-paying jobs in the past in order to pursue his
dream of serving his country on the battlefield in a major war; he did it again now.
151. Holt and Leyerzapf, Eisenhower: 7he Prewar Diaries, 425-29. Eisenhower drew a distinction between an active duty officer interfering with or ignoring his civilian superiors and a
retired officer running for office.
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MacArthur protested as well, but Ike did not take him seriously. 157 Eisenhower
was determined to leave: "I don't give a hoot who gets credit for anything in the
P.I. I got out clean-and that's that!" 158 Finally, the Eisenhowers were allowed
to leave the Philippines in November. 159 Qyezon arranged "a beautiful farewell
luncheon," and MacArthur was gracious as his one-time chief of staff boarded the
President Cleveland and left America's Far Eastern frontier. 160
Eisenhower's disdain for MacArthur was not temporary, was not born of the
heat of the moment, and was not based primarily on the larger uncontrollable
circumstances surrounding their work in the Philippines. Eisenhower's antipathy
was the direct result ofMac.A.rthur's decisions both in regard to Philippine defense
and his own conduct, especially his failure to accept responsibility for his own
decisions. Eisenhower thought many of MacArthur's decisions were dimwitted,
and his conduct reprehensible. Moreover, Eisenhower could hold a grudge. 161
The passing of time did not soften his opinion of the general. Well over two years
after he had left the Philippines, after he had proven himself during the Louisiana
Maneuvers in 1941, and after Army Chiefof Staff George Marshall had brought him
to the War Department, Eisenhower still held a deeply critical view of MacArthur, a
view he repeatedly recorded in his diary. MacArthur, who had been recalled to active
duty with the U.S. Army in July 1941 as tensions with Japan increased, commanded
both the Philippine Department and the army of the Philippine Commonwealth.
On 8 December 1941, Philippine time, Japanese forces struck the Philippines.
Within the week, Eisenhower was in Washington, summoned there in part because
of his knowledge of the Philippines and its defense capabilities, and also because
of a long list of interwar accomplishments. 162 As deputy and then head of the War
Plans Division, his primary concern was how best to aid the Philippines without
compromising the ability of the United States to some day win the war. 163
On 19 January 1942 Eisenhower wrote in his diary, "In many ways MacArthur
is as big a baby as ever. But we've got to keep him fighting." 164 On 23 January
Eisenhower described Major General Richard Sutherland, his replacement in
the Philippines, as one of MacArthur's "bootlickers," the kind of aide MacArthur
157. Eisenhower, At Ease, 231. In the years between the wars Eisenhower turned down opportunities coaching football, working in journalism, and helping Jews relocate. All of these jobs
paid substantially more than army majors earned.
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EisenhfJWer: 1he Prewar Diaries, 548.
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1he Prewar Diaries, 435, 436; Diary entry, 16 July 1939, in ibid., 440.
160. Eisenhower, At Ease, 23; Eisenhower, General Ike, 30, 31.
161. Ambrose, EisenhfJWer: Soldier, General ofthe Army, President Elect, 114.
162. Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die, 227, 249; Forrest Pogue, George C. Marshall· Ordeal and
Hope, 1939-1942 (New York: Viking Press, 1965), 237.
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164. Diary entry, 19 January 1942, in 1he Eisenhower Diaries, ed. Robert Ferrell (New York:
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preferred. 165 Four days later, Eisenhower responded to a "flood ofcommunications"
from MacArthur. Eisenhower thought these letters betrayed MacArthur's refusal
"to look facts in the face. An old trait of his." MacArthur wanted more resources
for the Philippines and the Far East. Two days before, Eisenhower had written in
his diary concerning the necessity to win in Europe first. 166 Eisenhower thought
MacArthur could not see the big picture and was "jittery." On 3 February, Ike
wrote, "Looks like MacArthur is losing his nerve. I am hoping that his yelps are
just his way of spurring us on, but he is always an uncertain factor. "167 A few days
later Eisenhower recorded his irritation at having to send a long letter on strategy
to MacArthur. The latter had sent a condescending message urging a flank attack
that Eisenhower thought was fit only for "plebes."168
In February, as the situation in the Philippines deteriorated, President Franklin
Roosevelt discussed MacArthur's fate with his closest advisers. The president,
following Marshall's advice, was convinced that the United States could not allow
the Japanese to take MacArthur prisoner if it could be avoided. Eisenhower wrote
the order to MacArthur to leave the Philippines. But Eisenhower himself disagreed
with the decision. In a rare lapse of judgment, Ike allowed his own deep animosity
toward the general to block his recognition of the obvious psychological importance
of getting MacArthur out of the Philippines. Eisenhower believed that MacArthur
would better serve the country by remaining at his post. He doubted MacArthur's
ability to effectively lead a highly complex and diverse military force in the Southwest
Pacific. Moreover, Ike believed the self-important and Caesar-like MacArthur
would not fit well in a command structure that necessarily included presidents,
prime ministers and a half a dozen chiefs of staff, not to mention scores of lesser
planners. 169 Finally, on 21 March Eisenhower wrote that he had "expurgated" the
diary's previous day. He was ashamed that he had grown so angry on that page and
so tore it out. Of course we cannot be sure what the cause of Ike's anger was, but
the context in the diary is MacArthur's successful escape from the Philippines and
Eisenhower's fear that the general would be able to command greater resources for
the Far East than could safely be allocated. He wrote, "Urging us in that direction
now will be: Australians, New Zealanders, our public (wanting support for the hero),
and MacArthur. If we tie up our shipping for the SW Pacific, we'll lose this war." 170
Interestingly, while Eisenhower ripped out his angry page, he did not take out the
comments noted above. Indeed, whenever Ike mentions MacArthur in his diary in
these early days of1942 his comment is always negative, and he lets those comments
stand. No exhaustion, no frustration, and no distraction could account for these
repeated vituperations in the Eisenhower diaries over so many years.
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It was well known in Washington that Eisenhower and MacArthur had parted
on poor terms and had little use for one another. Robert Sherwood argues this
antipathy was even a minor factor in President Roosevelt's decision in late 1943
to keep Marshall as chief of staff instead of giving him the Overlord command. If
Marshall had received the Overlord post, Eisenhower was to succeed him as chief
of staff, but his relationship with MacArthur was an obstacle. 171
The mutual ill-will persisted after the war. Eisenhower's accomplishments as
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe brought out the worst in MacArthur. He
seemed unable to abide a former subordinate rising to such heights. Oflke's military
record he said, "He let his generals in the field fight the war for him. They were good
and covered up for him. He drank tea with kings and queens. Just up Eisenhower's
alley." MacArthur moved from the ridiculous to the petty when, upon learning the
Canadians had named a mountain after Ike he remarked, "You know, it's a very
small peak, considering the Canadian terrain."172 On another occasion he castigated
Eisenhower's leadership in North Mrica and Europe. Echoing Field Marshal Bernard
Montgomery he said, "the European strategy was to hammer stupidly against the
enemy's strongest points."173 Perhaps MacArthur summed up his view ofEisenhower
when he remarked, "best clerk I ever had." 174 Eisenhower was no less caustic. In a
casual conversation, a woman voiced her admiration for MacArthur and asked Ike if
he knew the general. He responded, "Not only have I met him Madam, but I studied
dramatics under him for five years in Washington and four in the Philippines." 175
In addition, Eisenhower was unsympathetic when President Truman fired
MacArthur, his Far Eastern general, on 11 April1951. Ike remarked, "I hope he
will not return to the United States and become a controversial figure. I wouldn't
like it to lead to acrimony." Commenting on why Truman had fired MacArthur,
Ike said, "when you put on a uniform, there are certain inhibitions you accept."176
In the early 1960s Eisenhower, recalling MacArthur's behavior during the Bonus
March of1932, said, "I told that dumb son-of-a-bitch he had no business going
down there." 177 Indeed, Eisenhower thought so little of MacArthur in part
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because Ike believed the general reflected so poorly on the U.S. Army. He said, "I
just can't understand how such a damn fool could have gotten to be a General." 178
Eisenhower summarized his views of his former boss when he said, "I certainly
don't want to be put in the same class with MacArthur. What makes anyone think
MacArthur is a great man?" 179 Of course there were the occasional respectful
comments toward one another. Both men realized a public dispute between two
great soldiers would have served no purpose and damaged them both. Thus Piers
Brendan was surely correct when he wrote that these cordial comments were
"ringingly insincere expressions of mutual regard." 18°
In conclusion, Dwight Eisenhower believed that Douglas MacArthur fell
short of the leadership qualities that an American army officer should exhibit.
MacArthur was more interested in his own advancement, his own prestige, his
own ease, and hearing his own voice. MacArthur too often left relations with
Philippine President Manuel Qyezon to chance, and was all too ready to believe
his own superficial analysis of the relationship of the Philippines to the rest of
the Far East. Too often MacArthur sacrificed the team-the American Military
Mission and the Philippine army it was trying to build-to his dream of a 400,000man Philippine army worthy of a field marshal. Eisenhower's differences with
MacArthur were not over the kinds of things that are later forgotten; the catalyst
for these disagreements was a significant and philosophical disagreement over how
best to build a Filipino army. That dispute then developed into Eisenhower's lasting
disgust for MacArthur's command style. Particularly galling was MacArthur's
refusal to accept responsibility for his decisions. As Supreme Allied Commander
for Europe during World War II, Eisenhower wrote a press release before each
major operation, to be used if the action was unsuccessful. The notes informed the
world the operation had been a failure and that he alone was responsible. 181 1he
note he wrote for D-Day, 6 June 1944 reads:
Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a
satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision
to attack at this time and place was based on the best information
available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that Bravery and
devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the
attempt it is mine alone [italics mine]. 182
Fortunately these notes were never used, but the man who wrote them
remembered Douglas MacArthur.
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